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Abstract
This paper is about the relative impact of retirement and social class on individual at-
titudes towards welfare state policies in advanced industrial democracies. Which factor 
is more important in explaining individuals’ social policy preferences: socio-economic 
background or retirement? How can differences in patterns between countries be ex-
plained? These questions are explored using ordered logistic regression models on the 
1996 ISSP Role of Government data set for fifteen countries. First, it is shown that re-
tirement matters; there are consistent differences between policy areas that can be ex-
plained by life-cycle salience. Particularly in the case of preferences regarding education 
spending, being retired matters more than the socio-economic background. Second, 
some countries, such as the United States, show a higher salience of the age/retirement 
cleavage across all policy fields; age/retirement is a more important line of political con-
flict in these countries than in others. Third, country characteristics matter. Although 
the relative salience of retirement varies across policy areas, a large variance within each 
of the policy areas across countries is evident. Most interestingly, the more generous 
the state provisions are in a given policy area, the stronger the age/retirement cleavage 
is (with the exception of pension policies). Overall, the findings of this study are not in 
line with simple rational choice models. Instead, the explorative results call for more 
complex theoretical models, including institutional structures, in order to gain a better 
understanding of individuals’ attitudes towards the welfare state in aging societies.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Discussion Paper untersucht den relativen Einfluss von Alter und Klassenposi-
tion auf die individuellen Einstellungen zu wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Politiken in entwi-
ckelten Industrienationen. Welcher Faktor trägt mehr zur Erklärung von sozialpoli-
tischen Präferenzen bei: die sozioökonomische Klassenposition oder der Eintritt ins 
Rentenalter? Welche Faktoren erklären unterschiedliche Muster in einzelnen Ländern? 
Diese Fragen werden unter Verwendung des ISSP-Datensatzes „Role of Government“ 
beantwortet, der Daten zu fünfzehn Ländern enthält. Hieraus ergibt sich erstens, dass 
der Übertritt ins Rentenalter einen Erklärungsbeitrag leisten kann, besonders, wenn 
man unterschiedliche Dynamiken in einzelnen Politikfeldern miteinander vergleicht. 
Im Fall Bildung zeigt sich, dass der Alterseffekt einen größeren Erklärungsbeitrag leistet 
als die sozioökonomische Klassenposition. Darüber hinaus weisen einige Länder, wie 
zum Beispiel die USA, in der Altersdimension ein insgesamt höheres Konfliktpotenzial 
auf als andere. Daraus folgt, dass selbst in einem gemeinsamen Politikfeld Länderunter-
schiede wichtig bleiben, denn es zeigt sich ein hoher Grad an Variation der relativen Er-
klärungskraft der Altersvariablen zwischen Ländern. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein einfaches 
„Rational-Choice“-Modell die Ausprägung der Alterskonfliktlinie nicht ausreichend er-
klären kann. Die Autoren schlagen vor, stattdessen ein komplexeres Erklärungsmodell 
zu entwickeln, das den Einfluss der institutionellen Struktur von alternden Wohlfahrts-
staaten berücksichtigt.
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This article deals with the determinants of individual attitudes toward the welfare state. 
More specifically, it tests the relative importance of retirement in shaping these atti-
tudes, compared to the socio-economic background (class) of the individual, the latter 
being a factor commonly believed largely to determine social policy preferences. The 
size and direction of the impact of retirement is hugely important for two reasons. First, 
we are currently witnessing an era of massive population aging in advanced democratic 
welfare states. There are more and more retirees relative to the working population. If 
retirement has an important effect on attitudes, a growing number of individuals are 
subject to that impact. The aging process also leads to restructuring reforms of the wel-
fare state in order to cope with the changing social make-up. In a democratic process, 
the reforms need to be justified against electoral majorities. Since retirees make up a 
growing proportion of the electorate, retirees’ expectations matter for politicians who 
want to win elections. 
Second, the literature on attitudes toward the welfare state is not very clear about the im-
portance of retirement or age. Often, analyses are restricted to the working age popula-
tion, or age/retirement are included only as control variables that are explained in an ad 
hoc manner. We ground our empirical analyses in an explorative theoretical framework 
and argue that the importance of the age/retirement cleavage is systematically linked to 
the age-relatedness of redistributive policies. Throughout the article, we use the termi-
nology of cleavage in a weak sense. A full-blown political cleavage is a societal line of 
conflict along which voters consciously align themselves and political actors mobilize 
their constituencies. Therefore, social class is such a political cleavage. Age is not (yet) 
such a cleavage, but if we find a high degree of preference stratification by age this could 
be interpreted as a necessary condition for the formation of a full-blown cleavage.
In this article, we apply regression techniques to cross-sectional survey data for 15 OECD 
countries from 1996 (ISSP Role of Government III) and concentrate on spending atti-
tudes in the areas of education, pensions, health care, and unemployment. Thereby, we 
answer the following questions: Which factor is more important in explaining welfare 
state attitudes in a given social policy area, socio-economic background or retirement? 
What can explain differences in explanatory patterns between countries?
First, we find that retirement matters – there are consistent differences between attitudes 
toward policy areas that can be explained by life-cycle salience. Particularly in the case 
of preferences for education spending, we see a clear predominance of age/retirement 
over income. Second, some countries, such as the United States, show a higher salience 
of the age/retirement cleavage across all policy fields, that is, age/retirement is a more 
important line of political conflict in these countries than in others. Third, country 
We would like to thank Lothar Krempel and Philip Manow for their helpful suggestions. Earlier 
drafts of this paper were presented at several conferences: the Comparative Politics specialist group 
coference of the DVPW (November 2007 in Delmenhorst), the Political Economy specialist group 
conference of the DVPW (December 2007 in Kassel) and the Council for European Studies confer-
ence (March 2008 in Chicago). Data and Stata do-files are available for replication purposes.
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characteristics matter. Although the relative salience of the age/ retirement cleavage var-
ies across policy areas, we see – within one policy area – large variance of that cleavage. 
Most interestingly, the more generous the state provisions are in a given policy area, the 
stronger is the age/retirement cleavage (with the exception of pension policies). Overall, 
the results of this article call for a much more balanced view on the topic of age conflict 
in aging welfare states. In certain policy areas, differences in individual spending prefer-
ences can be better explained by taking age/retirement into account. However, these ef-
fects vary between countries due to economic and institutional factors. Overall, our find-
ings are not in line with simple rational choice models. Instead, the explorative results 
call for more complex theoretical models, including institutional structures, in order to 
understand an individual’s attitudes toward the welfare state in ageing societies.
Section 1 gives an overview of the literature and puts forward the theoretical model that 
we test. Section 2 presents the methods and data. Section 3 shows the empirical results, 
starting from simple bivariate findings. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and 
concludes the article.
1 Literature review and theoretical framework
Literature review
This analysis is inspired by debates in the popular and scholarly literature on the com-
ing conflict between generations. Population aging is a powerful force shaping the poli-
tics of welfare states in industrial nations. The intuition is that as the population share 
of older people increases, so will their political power. The decisive question is wheth-
er this will result in a “graying welfare state,” catering disproportionately to the needs 
of older people (for example, pensions, health care) and neglecting necessary invest-
ment in younger generations (that is, in education; Streeck 2007), or whether “politics 
as usual” will prevail. While it is hard to imagine an overt war of the generations, in 
which younger people and older people consciously take away public resources from 
each other, a situation might arise in which politicians cater to the needs of the largest 
voting group – retirees – by shifting resources incrementally from the young to the old 
(Kotlikoff/Leibfritz 1999). Demographic aging does not take place in isolation. Instead, 
welfare state reforms are becoming necessary to deal with the growing number of older 
citizens. If older voters want something different from the welfare state than younger 
people, these reforms are difficult to follow through in the face of an aging electorate 
(Goerres, forthcoming 2008).
This article relies on three distinct strands of the empirical literature: (1) studies on the 
role of age in public opinion on the welfare state; (2) the emerging literature on the im-
pact of social risks on policy preferences; and (3) analyses focusing on the consequences 
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of a larger share of older people on expenditures for the younger generation. Each of 
these research areas adds some insight into our problem, but each also lacks important 
aspects.
First, there is a variety of cross-national empirical studies on public opinion and the 
welfare state. This literature mushroomed after the publication of Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) seminal work and focuses mostly on finding attitude differences between the 
“three worlds of welfare capitalism.” Usually this is done by constructing summary 
measures that aggregate attitudes toward various policies into comprehensive indices 
– a problematic approach as we will see as differences between social policy fields are 
crucial. The indices are regressed onto a range of predictors and compared across states. 
Either age or a retirement dummy or both are routinely included as control variables. 
Despite the use of advanced statistical methods and numerous databases, this literature 
has not produced clear-cut results on the impact of age or retirement on social policy 
preferences. Some studies (Svallfors 2003, 2004; Linos/West 2003; Matheson/Wearing 
1999; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003) find that age is a significant determi-
nant of social policy preferences and that older people mostly have a higher inclination 
to support welfare state policies. Others (Papadakis/Bean 1993; Bean/Papadakis 1998; 
Andreß/Heien 2001; Jaeger 2006; Arts/Gelissen 2001) have questioned these findings 
from a methodological and substantive perspective and find no consistent impact of age 
on preferences. In our view, one major reason for the inconclusiveness of findings is the 
fact that all of these studies use indices aggregating attitudes toward a variety of differ-
ent welfare programs, although the “‘[t]he Welfare State’ is an umbrella term covering a 
range of governmental activities that have distinct characteristics” (Pierson 2001a: 11). 
A second strand of the literature looks at the association between social risks and policy 
preferences and does a better job of differentiating between levels of support for differ-
ent social policies. Building on Iversen and Soskice (2001), Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) 
state that individual preferences for market-correcting social policies depend on how 
people expect their income stream to flow in a pure market system: the lower and/or 
more uncertain they anticipate it to be, the more supportive of redistributive policies 
they are. They find that 
in the determination of political preferences over social policies, class notions in the sense of 
property, market and organizational experience do matter, even though often only marginally. 
In each instance, however, the single greatest effect is exercised by the socio-demographic vari-
ables (gender or age), followed by education. (Kitschelt/Rehm 2006: 74)
Older people are neither more nor less sympathetic to health care spending, but more 
likely to support unemployment benefits and less willing to spend tax money on edu-
cation. However, using a similar study design, Armingeon (2006) finds that subjective 
class remains the most important variable for attitudes toward what he terms the “tra-
ditional welfare state.” 
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A third part of the relevant literature focuses on the consequences of a larger share of 
older people on expenditures for the younger generation. Studies of this kind capture 
the impact of old age on welfare state preferences indirectly via outcomes: if an increase 
in the population share of older people in a given country/community has conse quences 
with regard to social policies or public spending, it is surmised that older people have 
distinct policy preferences that are followed through by political actors. 
As the American school system is organized on a local level (public schools are usu-
ally jointly financed by the school district and the state), research has been most fruit-
ful there. A number of studies (Brunner/Balsdon 2004; Busemeyer 2006; Button 1992; 
Harris et al. 2001; Ladd/Murray 2001; Miller 1996; Poterba 1997) have looked at the 
consequences of an increasing share of older people on education spending at the state 
and local levels, and most find evidence of a negative association between the two.1 
Pampel (1994) compares how the population share of the elderly influenced spending 
on family allowances, as well as on pensions in 18 countries between 1959 and 1986. He 
finds no evidence that having more older voters reduces family allowances, but instead 
that spending for both policies tends to go hand in hand because of spillover effects (see 
also Pampel/Williamson 1988). In contrast, comparative studies on the determinants 
of education spending (Busemeyer 2006, 2007; Iversen/Stephens 2007) find a negative 
impact of population aging on changes in spending.
Despite some deviant results, this part of the literature gives the most unambiguous 
results, and clearly speaks in favor of a generational conflict over social policy resources. 
But the studies look only at monetary outcomes and not at what we are interested in, 
namely preferences of individuals. 
We have seen that each of the three parts of the scholarly literature discussed so far con-
tributes important insights to our problem. But each also has its flaws. The literature 
on public opinion and the welfare state does not take into consideration the fact that 
support is not uniform across different policy areas. Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) and 
related studies are keen to underscore exactly this, but their focus is mainly on the active 
labor force. Finally, the literature focusing on the possibility of a generational conflict as 
a consequence of demographic aging does not look at people’s attitudes. In our article, 
we attempt to address these missing parts and try to unify the three approaches in the 
literature just discussed: How does retirement impact on preferences for redistributive 
policies? How does this impact relate to that of the social class position of an individual, 
which is the most important predictor of welfare state attitudes?
1 Recently, this kind of exercise has been undertaken for some European countries as well. Borge 
and Rattso (2007) for Denmark, and Grob and Wolter (2005) for Switzerland, find relatively 
unequivocal evidence that the share of older people has a negative impact on education spend-
ing. For Germany, various studies can detect only weak signs of a generational conflict (Baum/
Seitz 2003; Kempkes/Seitz 2006; Oberndorfer/Steiner 2006).
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Theoretical framework
This paper takes an explorative approach to the study of the impact of age/retirement 
on social policy preferences. Consequently, what we propose is not a fully fledged theo-
retical model, but a set of plausible hypotheses to guide empirical analysis.
The conventional political economy approach to the study of welfare state politics is 
to deduce individuals’ welfare state preferences from their socio-economic class posi-
tion, that is, their position in the distribution of incomes/skills (Meltzer/Richard 1981; 
Iversen/Soskice 2001; Cusack/Iversen/Rehm 2006). But while the socio-economic class 
cleavage remains important to the formation of redistributive preferences, the debate 
on the “coming war between generations” should inspire us to think more about the 
potential importance of the age/retirement cleavage. Figure 1 illustrates how the di-
mensions of class and age/retirement intersect for different types of social policies. It is 
important to emphasize that this illustration does not depict the actual distribution of 
spending or redistribution. Instead, it is a heuristic tool to structure plausible concep-
tions of the expected benefits to be gained from various types of social policies in rela-
tion to the individuals’ position on the class and age dimensions.
The structuring of redistributive policies 
Redistributive policies shift resources from one group to another. The trigger for the re-
distribution of resources is some notion of social need. Empirically, social need clusters 
around two dimensions: socio-economic class (income/education) and age. 
Socio-economic
class
Age
Education
Social assistance
Unemployment insurance
Health
Pensions
Figure 1 Individual interest in redistributive policies along two dimensions
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For instance, people receive social assistance (which we will not analyze empirically) be-
cause they are poor, regardless of their age. Their state of poverty constitutes the social 
need that redistributive policies address. Education, on the other hand, is concentrated 
mainly on the young. In addition, class position is less important than in the case of 
social assistance. Children of rich and poor parents attend public schools, but usually 
not the old. The opposite case is, of course, pensions. Here age clearly matters. It is well 
known that national pension systems differ widely with regard to the degree of redis-
tribution – with conservative welfare states being the least and Beveridge-type pension 
systems the most redistributive. The crucial point here, however, is that only old people 
receive pensions and in most OECD countries most older people receive public pension 
benefits, regardless of their class position.
The trigger for unemployment insurance is the social need for compensation for in-
come loss during times of unemployment, not age per se. Empirically, the risk of unem-
ployment is, of course, concentrated in certain age-groups (the young and the old). But 
unemployment insurance covers only the working-age population, not retired people. 
In addition, the individual’s position in terms of income/education clearly matters. The 
low-skilled generally face a higher risk of unemployment than the well-qualified.
Health insurance is a special case. On the one hand, the risk of illness strongly increases 
with age, and the bulk of health expenditure is concentrated on the elderly. On the 
other hand – and in contrast to pension policies – working-age individuals, too, enjoy 
concrete benefits from health insurance. In comparison with other types of social poli-
cies, public health insurance comes closest to a universal insurance model. Most people 
have an interest in insuring themselves against serious illnesses, although upper income 
classes might prefer to opt for private alternatives instead of public schemes. 
Summing up, various types of redistributive social policies differ greatly with respect to 
whether they are triggered mainly by age (education, pensions, health) or an individ-
ual’s state of economic need (social assistance, unemployment insurance). Of course, 
there are large differences between countries with respect to the specific structuring of 
social policies (for example, entitlement criteria, benefit generosity). But the crucial 
point for the present analysis is that there are general similarities in the structuring of 
redistributive policies across all advanced industrial democracies that have important 
consequences for the stratification of social policy preferences along the dimensions of 
age and income/education. 
Individual social policy preferences 
At the micro level, the starting point is the assumption that individual social policy 
preferences will be shaped by the individual’s expectation of becoming the beneficiary 
of a given redistributive policy. Above, we outlined how this naive class model lays the 
foundation for conventional political economy models that explain redistributive pref-
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erences. Here, however, we argue that it is not only the individual’s class position that 
determines her social policy preferences, but also her position in the life cycle, that is, 
whether she is retired or not. The reason for the presence of such a “retirement” effect 
is that social policies are triggered not only by economic need (that is, income), but 
also by age-related aspects. In this sense, welfare state policies structure welfare state 
constituencies: The German sociologist Rainer Lepsius has coined the term “provision 
classes” (Versorgungsklassen; Lepsius 1979; see also Alber 1984). In the attempt to over-
come the socio-economic stratification of societies, welfare states themselves constitute 
provision classes by coupling benefits to entitlement criteria (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Welfare state constituencies develop an interest in the maintenance and expansion of 
public social programs (Pierson 2001b), which is why scholars expect the graying of the 
welfare state in the wake of population aging. For our purposes, the decisive point is that 
welfare state entitlements (the triggers in the constitution of social need) are based not 
only on the individual’s position in the distribution of incomes, but also on her age.
Education and pension policies are the obvious examples of the age-related character 
of entitlements. Hence, we expect “retirement” effects to show up most clearly in those 
policy fields. Given that education is focused on the young, it is to be expected that 
retired people are less in favor of increases in education spending than the non-retired, 
controlling for their socio-economic status. The case of pensions is related to, but dif-
ferent from education: of course, retired people are the prime beneficiaries of pension 
spending. Therefore, a rational choice model for preference formation would expect 
strong support on the part of retirees for further increases in spending. In contrast to 
education, the current non-beneficiaries of pension spending (the non-retired) expect 
to become a beneficiary after they exit from working life. Therefore, they might also 
support higher pension spending in anticipation of their later life as retirees (Goerres, 
forthcoming 2008).
Health care and unemployment insurance are more ambiguous because class and age/
retirement effects overlap. In the case of unemployment insurance, the risk of social 
need tends to be concentrated in the lower skills strata. The poorly skilled will therefore 
be more in favor of spending increases than the rich. Given that the retired have exited 
the labor market, they may be expected to be against spending increases on unemploy-
ment. Therefore, the expectation is that both class and age/retirement effects will be 
present in the case of unemployment.
For health, we expect a similar result; that is, the rich will oppose increases in spend-
ing because this increases their tax bill. In addition, a strong public insurance system 
crowds out private alternatives, which are preferred by those who can afford them. As 
is well known, health expenditures increase with old age, so that the non-retired might 
be opposed to increases in spending that accrue mainly to the retired. But, as in the case 
of pension spending, the non-retired can expect to need comprehensive health care in 
their later old age as well, so that they are more willing to tolerate current pensioners’ 
overproportional draw on the system’s resources. 
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To sum up: 
Relative importance of retirement effect: Age/retirement effects will show up more 
strongly for those types of social policies whose redistributive impact is more age-related 
than income-related, namely education and pensions. Class effects will dominate in the 
case of spending on health and unemployment, but age effects will be visible as well.
Direction of retirement effect: We expect retired people to be more in opposition to in-
creases in education and unemployment spending. Equally, we expect more supportive 
spending preferences with regard to pensions and health care from the retired. 
Differences between countries: In addition to differences in the cleavage structure across 
policy fields, we expect strong differences across countries in line with the peculiarities 
of national welfare state regimes. For example, Lynch (2006) has shown that welfare 
states exhibit stark differences with regard to their age-orientation. The proposition to 
be tested is therefore whether the old-age orientation of welfare states is associated with 
the age/retirement cleavage in individual preferences for social policies. According to 
the logic of “provision classes,” we would expect the age/retirement cleavage to be more 
salient in those welfare states that are more geared toward the elderly, whereas the class 
cleavage will be more important in age-neutral welfare states. We also explore various 
alternative macro-level explanations as to their relationship with the strength of the 
age/retirement cleavage.
2 Data, methods, and research design
Data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on the third wave of ISSP’s “Role of Government,” 
conducted around 1996, as it includes questions on a variety of welfare policies, as well 
as detailed demographic information. After excluding the countries for which insuf-
ficient data are available, we were able to conduct our analysis for 15 countries: Austra-
lia, Canada, France, Germany (East and West), Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Altogether, data for 
22,575 people are available; the sample size for the individual countries varies between 
989 and 2,518.
These are not the best data that we could wish for. It would be ideal to have panel data 
that are comparable across countries. Thereby, we would be able to follow intraindi-
vidual changes. The cross-sectional nature of this dataset, strictly speaking, allows us 
only to compare retired individuals with fellow non-retired individuals. There is no op-
portunity to follow an individual through the transition to retirement. The underlying 
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assumption therefore is that the causal chains that influence a retiring individual are 
similar across individuals and – to some extent – stable across time periods. Further-
more, the cross-sectional nature of our data makes it impossible to separate generation-
al differences – which also make the retirees different from younger people – from the 
pure age/retirement effect. We are therefore unable to show a “clean” retirement effect. 
But another analysis of the ISSP data in West Germany and Britain has demonstrated 
that generational differences do not exist (Goerres 2007).
Methods and variables
We conduct ordered logistic regression analyses for each country separately. The ISSP 
data include various items capturing the individual’s attitudes toward the welfare state. 
There are four areas of redistributive spending: unemployment, education, pensions, 
and health. The question on spending reads:
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to 
see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more,” it 
might require a tax increase to pay for it. More or less government spending on: health, educa-
tion, old age pensions, unemployment benefits. Answer categories: Spend much more, spend 
more, spend the same as now, spend less, spend much less.
One must be careful in interpreting this indicator. It is not what one might call a trade-
off question. Individuals are not asked to disburse a given amount across policy areas. 
They are implicitly asked to compare their theoretical favorite spending levels with the 
current one for each policy area separately. Although they are reminded that higher 
spending levels can lead to increases in taxes, they are not required to make actual cal-
culations.
As independent variables we use, alongside gender, two variables of socio-economic 
background: education (7 levels of educational achievement) and household income 
on a 10-point scale (each category is the country-specific decile). We imputed missing 
values on the income variable from other variables in the data set.2 Also, we include a 
general measure of spending propensity.3 Some individuals tend to agree more with 
2 We ran a regression (listwise deletion) with income as our dependent variable. As independent 
variables we used a variety of demographic and attitudinal information that can be assumed to 
correlate with income (such as gender, attitudes on taxation, or age). We then used the predicted 
values to impute for missing data. The percentage of cases that were imputed varies between 
0 (Italy) and 35 percent (Japan).
3 For this measure, we used four questions that were of the same form as the ones for our depen-
dent variable. They asked whether the government should spend more, the same, or less on the 
environment, law enforcement, defense, and culture and the arts. A principal component factor 
analysis was conducted. All items loaded high on one factor. The predicted values for each case 
are used as our general measure of spending propensity.
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survey items because of personality traits that have nothing to do with politics or with 
the survey design. Items that are part of a larger battery – like ours – tend to be answered 
in a consistent manner, even if the individuals’ underlying attitudes vary. By including 
this extra measure, we take out the variance that is unrelated to the phenomenon that 
we are interested in.4
The empirical procedure consists of four steps. First, we demonstrate that retirement 
matters for public opinion toward the welfare state by looking at some descriptive pub-
lic opinion differences between the retired and the non-retired groups.
Second, we run a regression on all countries together and on each country sample sepa-
rately for each of the dependent variables.5 From the single-country regression results, 
we create a cleavage measure to assess the intensity of stratification that comes from so-
cio-economic background and from age/retirement. The measures are the impact size 
of the income variable and the impact size of the retirement dummy. For income, it is 
the difference in predicted probability (of being in favor of more or much more spend-
ing for the respective policy area) of the income variable at its maximum, minus the 
predicted probability of the income variable at its minimum, with everything else held 
at its mean (class cleavage).6 For retirement, it is the difference in predicted probabilities 
between the retired and the non-retired group, with everything else held constant (age/
retirement cleavage). As we run four regressions per country for 15 countries, we get 60 
cleavage measures for income and 60 for retirement. The higher the value, the stronger 
the stratification of preferences on that policy dimension by that social condition. 
Third, we rank countries according to the strength of the age/retirement cleavage.
Finally, we offer some tentative bivariate correlations between the age/retirement and 
the class cleavages and some plausible explanatory macro factors. Thereby we explore 
plausible explanations for the immense variance between countries within one policy 
area.
4 Due to data restrictions, we were not able to include measures of social class (Kitschelt/Rehm 
2006) or skill specificity (Iversen/Soskice 2001), as the necessary information to derive these 
categories (namely the ISCO-codes) is not available for retirees in most countries.
5 The Pseudo R² for our models is between 0.05 and 0.07 for all countries together and varies for 
individual countries. This might not seem very high, but studies with similar research designs 
obtain about the same level. Examples are Svallfors (2003), Cusack/Iversen/Rehm (2006), and 
Kitschelt/Rehm (2006).
6 One could argue that the difference between the minimum income group, the bottom decile, 
and the maximum income group, the top decile, has very little social meaning. Very few people 
are likely to experience that difference, whereas the move from non-retirement to retirement is 
experienced by many people. We calculated the difference between the third and the 7th decile 
for income as well. But the results are obviously directly proportional to the minimum–maxi-
mum calculations.
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3 Results
Descriptive results
Figures 2 to 5 show variations between 15 countries as to four dependent variables: 
preferences on health care spending, unemployment spending, education spending, 
and pension spending. If the column goes to the positive side, retired people are more 
in favor of spending in that area; if it goes to the left, retired people are less in favor of 
spending in that area compared to non-retired people. Each column summarizes the 
aggregate public opinion of the group of the retired minus the opinion of the group of 
the non-retired. The public opinion of each group is calculated by subtracting the pro-
portion of people who want to decrease spending from the proportion of people who 
are in favor of higher spending.
Comparing the overall picture for the four areas of spending, we can see that in general 
retired people tend to be more in favor of pension spending and less in favor of educa-
tion spending than younger people. This overall result is the typical life-cycle effect that 
we would expect to see. The average differences between retirees and non-retired lie at 
about 8 percent for education spending and at about 10 percent for pension spending. 
Thirteen out of 15 countries show retirees as less in favor of educational spending than 
non-retired individuals and more in favor of pension spending. But the results are not 
uniform across all countries. 
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Figure 2 Differences in health care spending preferences between retirees and 
 non-retired individuals in 15 OECD countries in 1996 (positive values: 
 retirees more in favor than non-retired)
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Figure 3 Differences in unemployment spending preferences between retirees  
 and non-retired individuals in 15 OECD countries in 1996 (positive  
 values: retirees more in favor than non-retired)
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Figure 4 Differences in education spending preferences between retirees and  
 non-retired individuals in 15 OECD countries in 1996 (positive values:  
 retirees more in favor than non-retired)
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For health and unemployment, the average differences between the retired and the non-
retired groups are only 3 percent and 4 percent, respectively. We find both patterns 
of difference between younger and retired people, that is, the number of countries in 
which the retired are more supportive of increased spending is similar to the number of 
countries in which they are less supportive.
The graphs show that there are differences between retired and non-retired individuals 
and that these differences vary across countries. The variance across countries could 
be due to genuine differences in the meaning of retirement for individual preferences. 
But they could also stem from compositional effects – retirees in one country could be 
richer, relative to the working population, than in another country. In order to disen-
tangle these effects, we now turn to multivariate methods.
Multivariate results
Table 1 lists eight regressions for all 15 countries together. The regressions include coun-
try dummies to account for country specificities that can cause different intercepts. As 
we can see, the retired dummy and some of the interactions between retired and income 
and retired and education are significant. This means that the differences that we have 
seen between the retired and the non-retired in the descriptive results are not due to 
–25 –15 –5 5 15 25
Figure 5 Differences in pension spending preferences between retirees and  
 non-retired individuals in 15 OECD countries in 1996 (positive values:  
 retirees more in favor than non-retired)
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compositional effects due to gender, education, or income. Even when we account for 
these effects, there remains a residual effect of retirement that in some cases interacts 
with effects of education and income. The group of older retirees might be less educated 
due to cohort effects or consist of more women due to varying mortality rates, but this 
alone cannot explain their differences.
Figures 6 to 9 show the variance of the cleavage measures calculated from single-country 
regressions for all four areas of spending and all 15 countries. The black columns rep-
resent the strength of the age/retirement cleavage; it can range from 0 percent (health 
in Norway) to 17 percent (education in the USA). That means that the difference in the 
probability of being in favor of more spending between the retired and the non-retired 
may be nil in one country/policy field and up to 17 percent in the most extreme case. 
The gray columns stand for the strength of the class cleavage; it can range from about 
1 percent (education in Japan) to about 42 percent (unemployment spending in Great 
Britain). 
The cleavage measures stand for the intensity of stratification of individual attitudes to-
ward certain redistributive policy areas – in terms of either class or age/retirement. They 
can be compared across countries and across policy areas because they are measured in 
probability changes (in effect, percentage points). 
Figure 6 Cleavages of age and class in preferences for health care spending 
 in 15 OECD countries in 1996
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Percentage of attitude differences between retired/non-retired (dark grey) and highest/lowest income 
class (light grey) with everything else held at its mean value.
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For health care spending, we find that the age/retirement cleavage tends to be smaller 
than the class cleavage. The mean of the former lies at 3 percent compared to 11 percent 
in the case of the latter. Compared to the age/retirement cleavage in other policy areas, 
the age cleavage is relatively small. This finding runs counter to the expectation that the 
non-retired will oppose increases in health spending. Apparently, demand for universal 
health insurance is more dependent on the individual’s class position than on her posi-
tion in the life cycle. The maximum difference between retired and non-retired is about 
9 percent in the United States. The preference stratification by income varies between 
about 2 percent in Italy and 34 percent in Canada. We will further explore the differ-
ences between countries in the next section.
In the area of unemployment spending, there is a generally high level of class stratifica-
tion (large gray columns across countries with a mean of 20 percent). This is in line with 
our expectations: income as a main indicator of socio-economic position should be 
very important in determining one’s expectations of protection from the labor market. 
Surprisingly, some countries also show a strong stratification by age (with a mean of 5 
percent), although it never reaches the magnitude of the class cleavage. For example, 
in Sweden, the age/retirement cleavage is 17 percent, whereas the class cleavage is only 
slightly larger, at 19 percent. As expected, age/retirement and class effects overlap in the 
case of unemployment spending, with retirees being opposed to higher spending (see 
the negative regression coefficient in models 3 and 4 of Table 1).
Figure 7 Cleavages of age and class in preferences for unemployment spending  
 in 15 OECD countries in 1996
Percentage of attitude differences between retired/non-retired (dark grey) and highest/lowest income 
class (light grey) with everything else held at its mean value.
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In the area of education spending, the general pattern shows a strong age/retirement 
cleavage with a mean of 7 percent. In comparison to the other policy areas, age/retire-
ment effects are most pronounced in the case of education. Also, the age/retirement 
cleavage is more important than the class cleavage, which has a mean of 6 percent. 
Education policy has unambiguous life-cycle implications. Younger people, who either 
are still in education or who have school-attending children, benefit more from public 
education than older retirees. Thus, age is an important factor explaining differences in 
attitudes toward educational spending.
Finally, the cleavage measure in pension spending does not show the expected uniform 
prevalence of strong age stratification. The average level of the age/retirement cleavage 
is more similar to unemployment than to education, meaning that the life cycle does 
not structure attitudes as strongly as in the area of education. Class effects are much 
more important than age in many countries, such as New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
the USA. The mean of the age/retirement cleavage lies at 6 percent and that of the class 
cleavage at 17 percent. This poses a puzzle, although we were expecting a pre-retirement 
effect with middle-aged members of the working population having a vital interest in 
higher public pension spending levels. The “antagonism” between young and old is not 
very prevalent in the area of pension policy, which is the most important policy area in 
need of reform in aging societies.
Figure 8 Cleavages of age and class in preferences for educational spending  
 in 15 OECD countries in 1996
Percentage of attitude differences between retired/non-retired (dark grey) and highest/lowest income 
class (light grey) with everything else held at its mean value.
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In addition to simple average cleavage effects (Figures 6 to 9), we calculated the impact 
of the age/retirement cleavage in interaction with the class cleavage (results are ob-
tainable from the authors). Overall, the results of the single-country regressions with 
interaction effects between retired and income confirm the results obtained above. This 
is particularly noteworthy for pension spending where we obtained results against our 
expectations: in nine out of 15 countries, we find the class cleavage to be stronger for 
retired people than for the non-retired. The naive conception of pensioners being in 
favor of more public spending on pensions is therefore not adequate. Instead, it is nec-
essary to think more clearly about who is interested in more spending on pensions and 
why. A cursory inspection of the variation of the explanatory contribution of the age/
retirement cleavage suggests that the nature of pension systems matters. In Bismarckian 
pension systems (for example, Germany, Italy, and France), the level of benefits depends 
strongly on previous earnings and is covered by protection of confidence. Consequently, 
the class cleavage among the retired (and among the non-retired) is less strong. In Bev-
eridge-type and residualist public pension systems (for example, Sweden, Japan, New 
Zealand, USA, Great Britain, and Ireland), class effects within the group of retirees are 
more pronounced because poor pensioners benefit disproportionately from the public 
system and rich pensioners prefer to live off and invest in private alternatives.
Figure 9 Cleavages of age and class in preferences for pension spending 
 in 15 OECD countries in 1996
Percentage of attitude differences between retired/non-retired (dark grey) and highest/lowest income 
class (light grey) with everything else held at its mean value.
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Summing up, we find a strong age/retirement cleavage in the case of education. In the 
other policy areas (unemployment, pension, health), we find both class and age effects, 
although according to the “naive” model of preference formation proposed above, we 
would have expected stronger age effects. Given the explorative approach of this paper, 
these findings pose new questions. Apparently, a model purely based on rational expec-
tations cannot explain the variation in individual social policy preferences very well. 
More sophisticated explanations need to be developed in the future. 
Macro-level relationships: Rankings and bivariate correlations
As a final step, we now take a tentative look at the macro features of the results we pre-
sented in the previous sections. Which countries have the highest potential for a conflict 
between age groups? The magnitude of age stratification in social policy preferences 
can be interpreted as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for latent cleavages to 
become manifest. It is possible to rank countries according to the size of the age/retire-
ment cleavage measure in the four policy areas. Table 2 provides a ranking of countries, 
with columns 3 to 6 showing the ranking in the four policy areas and a summary (av-
erage) measure in the second column that, in turn, is the foundation for the absolute 
ranks of countries shown in the first column. The numbers show that some countries 
exhibit stronger overall age/retirement effects than others. In general, the populations 
of France and the United States show high levels of age/retirement-related stratification. 
That means that – no matter what the policy area – knowing the age of a person tells 
us a great deal about the difference between that person’s attitudes and those of people 
of other ages in these two countries. At the bottom of the table, we find New Zealand 
and Italy, where differences in attitudes can generally not be well explained by age dif-
Table 2 Ranking of 15 OECD countries according to age/retirement cleavage
Absolute  
rank
Mean Rank  
health care
Rank  
unemployment
Rank  
education
Rank  
pension
France  1  2.5 2 3 3 2
USA  2  3.75 1 10 1 3
Japan  3  4.5 4 2 7 5
Sweden  4  6 5 1 4 14
Australia  5  6.5 3 9 5 9
Switzerland  6  6.75 7 7 9 4
Great Britain  7  7.75 6 4 8 13
Ireland  8  8.5 13 8 6 7
East Germany  9  8.75 8 12 14 1
Canada  10  9.25 11 13 2 11
Spain  11  9.5 9 6 15 8
West Germany  12  10.5 10 11 11 10
Norway  13 11.25 15 5 10 15
Italy  14 11.75 14 14 13 6
New Zealand  15 12.75 12 15 12 12
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ferences. In between, there are a few countries that do not have clear-cut patterns, with 
some cleavage measures being high-ranked and others low-ranked.
Let us now turn to bivariate correlations between the age/retirement measure and some 
conceptual variables. Is there a systematic pattern in respect of why the countries differ 
so widely in the strength of their respective age/retirement and class cleavages? In order 
Table 3 Correlations, age cleavage and several macro indicators in 15 OECD countries  
  around 1996
Health care  
policies
Unemployment 
policies
Education  
policies
Pension  
policies
General     
GDP per capita .52 0.02 .66 0.00
Total public social  
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 0.05
 
 .62
 
 –0.08
 
 –0.16
Total subsidies (% GDP) –0.19 .57 0.00 –0.39
Overall welfare state 
generosity index
 
 –0.19
 
 .58
 
 –0.06
 
 –0.48
Gini coefficient 0.20 –.71 0.10 0.40
Age orientation (Lynch) –0.08 .02 –0.38 0.30
Age structure     
% aged 15 or younger 0.09 –0.28 0.39 –0.14
% aged 65 or older 0.01 .65 –0.30 –0.12
Age dependency ratio 0.14 0.36 0.23 –0.38
Education     
Total education  
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 0.36
 
 0.11
 
 .75
 
 –0.18
Public education  
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 –0.03
 
 0.24
 
 0.41
 
 –0.40
Private education  
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 0.54
 
 –0.35
 
 0.37
 
 0.18
Health Care Expenditure
Total health care  
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 .71
 
 –0.07
 
 0.65
 
 0.33
Public health care 
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 0.38
 
 .56
 
 0.42
 
 –0.16
Private health care 
expenditure (% GDP)
 
 0.59
 
 –0.32
.50  
 0.44
Health care  
generosity index
 
 –0.29
 
 .65
 
 –0.26
 
 –0.37
Unemployment     
Unemployment benefit 
generosity index
 
 0.06
 
 .57
 
 0.27
 
 –0.44
Pension
Pension generosity index –0.16 0.06 –0.05 –0.29
N = 13 (excludes West and East Germany); * not available for Switzerland.
All data are for 1996 unless stated otherwise.
Sources: GDP per capita: OECD (2003b); Total public social expenditure, age structure variables: OECD, 
(2007c); Total subsidies: own calculations based on OECD (2007a); Overall Welfare State Generosity Index, 
Health Care Generosity Index, Unemployment Benefit Generosity Index, Pension Generosity Index (ten year 
average from 1987–1996): Lyle (2006); Gini coefficient (latest available + measure): CIA (2007); Age Orienta-
tion: Lynch (2006); Health care expenditure variables: OECD (2003a); Education expenditure variables: OECD 
(2007b).
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to test for this, we perform bivariate correlations between the strength of the age/retire-
ment and some key macro variables.7 West and East Germany were excluded as they 
share a common institutional background and the attitude differences between the two 
obviously have to be explained by variables that are not so easily quantifiable. 
We find that there is no single variable (such as Lynch’s age orientation factor) that 
determines how strong the cleavages are – for example, that correlate highly with the 
conflict patterns in all four areas. Instead, we find that the strength of the cleavages de-
pends very much on concrete spending levels in each country. Higher spending and/or 
more generous policy schemes are associated with a more pronounced age/retirement 
conflict with respect to health care, unemployment, and education policies. For pension 
policies, however, it is the other way around: if they are more generous, the age conflict 
over them decreases.
Table 3 lists the pairwise correlations of some key macro variables with the strength of 
the age/retirement cleavage. For attitudes toward health care policies, we find that the 
higher the total health care expenditure, the larger the age/retirement cleavage (r = 0.71). 
Especially the amount of private spending on health care is important. The strength of 
the age/retirement cleavage for unemployment policies is driven by how much is spent 
on the unemployed – the more generous the policies, the stronger the conflict between 
the retired and the non-retired (r = 0.57). But we find that the more unequal a society is 
(measured by the Gini coefficient), the weaker is the age/retirement cleavage. This prob-
ably reflects the fact that societies are more unequal precisely because they provide little 
support for the unemployed and there is a general consensus of unwillingness to sup-
port such targeted policies. Although the age/retirement cleavage over unemployment 
spending is rather weak in comparison to the class cleavage, we find signs that it might 
become more important in the future: the older a society is (measured by the share 
of people 65 and older), the larger is the age/retirement cleavage on unemployment 
spending (r = 0.65). And as societies grow older in the years to come, it can be expected 
that this cleavage will become more important. 
The strength of the age/retirement conflict over education spending follows the same 
pattern: the higher the total education expenditure, the more pronounced are both 
cleavages (r = 0.75). 
Finally, public opinion on pension spending follows a completely different pattern than 
all the other policies: if pension regimes are more generous, the age conflict over them 
decreases, although the correlation is rather weak (r = –0.29). We find the same pattern 
if we look at general measures of welfare spending, such as Scruggs’ index of overall 
welfare state generosity (r = –0.48), signaling that attitudes toward pension spending are 
different from attitudes toward the other policies.
7 We calculated the same correlations for the class cleavage measure, but to save space we do not 
present them here. Results are obtainable from the authors.
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As interesting as these findings are, it should be kept in mind that they reflect only the 
patterns in 13 countries at one point in time and therefore can be considered only tenta-
tive. We are also unable to say anything about the causality of the correlations – is there 
conflict because of the spending patterns or do spending patterns follow the preferences 
of influential groups? 
4 Conclusions
Our conclusions can be condensed into four statements:
First, age matters. The empirical evidence presented in this article has confirmed the 
relevance of the class cleavage for explaining individual preferences for redistributive 
social policies. But we have shown that, in addition to the class cleavage, the age/re-
tirement cleavage too can shape redistributive preferences. Therefore, the convention-
al wisdom in the political economy literature – namely that “people’s position in the 
economy” (Cusack/Iversen/Rehm 2006: 366) determines policy preferences – should be 
amended to take account of “people’s position in the life cycle.” 
Second, the relevance of the age/retirement cleavage varies across policy fields. This is 
because redistributive social policies vary according to the degree to which they are age-
related. The strongest age effects were found in the case of preferences for education 
spending, while the class cleavage dominates most clearly in the case of unemployment 
spending.
Third, in addition to the variance in the relative relevance of cleavages across policy 
fields, we found large differences across countries within a given policy area. Even in the 
case of education spending, the severity of the age/retirement cleavage varies consider-
ably. In the final parts of the empirical analysis, we attempted to provide some explana-
tions of this. We found that the age orientation of the welfare state (Lynch 2006) is less 
relevant than its generosity. Here it becomes clear that the case of pension spending 
poses an intriguing puzzle that needs to be explored further. While in the case of prefer-
ences for unemployment, health care, and education spending, higher actual levels of 
spending were associated with stronger cleavage structures, a more generous pension 
regime is associated with an attenuated age/retirement cleavage. In addition, we found 
that in the case of pension spending, the class cleavage within the group of retired peo-
ple is stronger than for the non-retired, particularly in countries without a Bismarckian 
pension system.
Fourth, in terms of theory-building, the empirical analysis has shown that hypotheses 
based on a simple rational choice model of preference formation cannot explain the 
importance of age/retirement very well. Particularly in the cases of pension and health 
Busemeyer, Goerres, Weschle: Demands for Redistributive Policies in an Era of Demographic Aging 27
spending, a naive conception of the importance of age/retirement would have expected 
much stronger effects. Given the explorative and empirical nature of this article, we 
hope the findings encourage scholars to develop new theoretical tools in order to im-
prove our understanding of the nature of political conflicts in aging societies.
References
Alber, Jens, 1984: Versorgungsklassen im Wohlfahrtsstaat. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie 36, 225–251.
Andreß, Hans-Jürgen/Thorsten Heien, 2001: Four Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes? A Comparison 
of Germany, Norway, and the United States. In: European Sociological Review 17(4), 337–356.
Armingeon, Klaus, 2006: Reconciling Competing Claims of the Welfare State Clientele: The Politics 
of Old and New Social Risk Coverage in Comparative Perspective. In: Klaus Armingeon/Giu-
liano Bonoli (eds.), The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-War Social Poli-
cies to New Social Risks. London: Routledge, 100–122.
Arts, Will/John Gelissen, 2001: Welfare States, Solidarity and Justice Principles: Does the Type Really 
Matter? In: Acta Sociologica 44, 283–299.
Baum, Britta/Helmut Seitz, 2003: Demographischer Wandel und Bildungsausgaben: Empirische 
Evidenz für die westdeutschen Länder. In: Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 72(2), 
205–219.
Bean, Clive/Elim Papadakis, 1998: A Comparison of Mass Attitudes toward the Welfare State in Dif-
ferent Institutional Regimes, 1985–1990. In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research 
10(3), 211–236.
Blekesaune, Morten/Jill Quadagno, 2003: Public Attitudes toward Welfare State Policies: A Compara-
tive Analysis of 24 Nations. In: European Sociological Review 19(5), 415–427.
Borge, Lars-Erik/Jorn Rattso, 2007: Young and Old Competing for Public Welfare Services. CESifo 
Working Paper Series No. 2223. Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 
Department of Economics Working Papers.
Brunner, Eric/Ed Balsdon, 2004: Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School 
Spending. In: Journal of Urban Economics 56, 369–388.
Busemeyer, Marius R., 2006: Die Bildungsausgaben der USA im internationalen Vergleich: Politische 
Geschichte, Debatten und Erklärungsansätze. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
——, 2007: Determinants of Public Education Spending in 21 OECD Democracies, 1980–2001. In: 
Journal of European Public Policy 14(4), 582–610.
Button, James W., 1992: A Sign of Generational Conflict: The Impact of Florida’s Aging Voters on 
Local School and Tax Referenda. In: Social Science Quarterly 73(4), 786–797.
CIA, 2007: World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-
book/index.html (last accessed 12-20-2007).
Cusack, Thomas/Torben Iversen/Philipp Rehm, 2006: Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides 
of Government Redistribution. In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3), 365–389.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 1990: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Gelissen, John, 2000: Popular Support for Institutionalized Solidarity: A Comparison between Euro-
pean Welfare States. In: International Journal of Social Welfare 9(4), 285–300.
Goerres, Achim 2007: Generational Demands on the Welfare State: Comparing Baby-boomers in West 
Germany and Britain. Paper presented at APSA Annual Conference, Chicago.
——, 2008: Reforming the Welfare State in Times of Grey Electoral Majorities: The Myth of the 
“Grey Vote” in Germany. In: German Policy Studies, forthcoming; also published as: Can We 
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 08 / 3
Reform the Welfare State in Times of “Grey” Majorities? The Myth of an Electoral Opposition Be-
tween Younger and Older Voters in Germany. MPIfG Working Paper 07/5. Cologne: Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies.
Grob, Ueli/Stefan C. Wolter, 2005: Demographic Change and Public Education Spending: A Conflict 
between Young and Old? CESifo Working Paper Series 1555. St. Gallen: University of St. Gallen.
Harris, Amy Rehder/William N. Evans/Robert M. Schwab, 2001: Education Spending in an Aging 
America. In: Journal of Public Economics 81, 449–472.
Iversen, Torben/David Soskice, 2001: An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences. In: American Po-
litical Science Review 95(4), 875–893.
Iversen, Torben/John D. Stephens, 2007: Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Hu-
man Capital Formation. Conference paper. Conference on “Research Frontiers in Comparative 
Politics.” Duke University, Durham, NC, April 27–28, 2007.
Jaeger, Mads Meier, 2006: Welfare Regimes and Attitudes Toward Redistribution: The Regime Hy-
pothesis Revisited. In: European Sociological Review 22(2), 157–170.
Kempkes, Gerhard/Helmut Seitz, 2006: Auswirkungen des demographischen Wandels auf die Bil-
dungsausgaben: Eine empirische Analyse der Ausgaben im Schulbereich auf der Landes- und 
Gemeindeebene. In: Statistik und Wissenschaft 9, 99–128.
Kitschelt, Herbert/Philipp Rehm, 2006: New Social Risk and Political Preferences. In: Klaus Armin-
geon/Giuliano Bonoli (eds.), The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-War 
Social Policies to New Social Risks. London: Routledge, 52–82.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J./Willi Leibfritz, 1999: An International Comparison of Generational Accounts. 
In: Alan J. Auerbach/Laurence J. Kotlikoff/Willi Leibfritz (eds.), Generational Accounting around 
the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 73–101.
Ladd, Helen/Sheila Murray, 2001: Intergenerational Conflict Reconsidered: Country Demographic 
Structure and the Demand for Public Education. In: Economics of Education Review 20, 343–
357.
Lepsius, M. Rainer, 1979: Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. In: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte. Göt-
tingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 166–209.
Linos, Katerina/Martin West, 2003: Self-Interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitude to Redistribution: Re-
addressing the Issue of Cross-National Variation. In: European Sociological Review 19(4), 393–
409.
Lynch, Julia, 2006: Age in the Welfare State: The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers, and 
Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matheson, George/Michael Wearing, 1999: Within and Without: Labour Force Status and Political 
Views in Four Welfare States. In: Stefan Svallfors/Peter Taylor-Gooby (eds.), The End of the Wel-
fare State? Responses to State Retrenchment. London: Routledge, 135–160.
Meltzer, Allan H./Scott F. Richard, 1981: A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. In: Journal of 
Political Economy 89(5), 914–927.
Miller, Cynthia, 1996: Demographics and Spending for Public Education: A Test of Interest Group 
Influence. In: Economics of Education Review 15(2), 175–185.
Oberndorfer, Ulrich/Viktor Steiner, 2006: Intergenerational Conflict, Partisan Politics, and Public 
Higher Education Spending: Evidence from the German States. IZA Discussion Paper 2417. Bonn: 
IZA.
OECD, 2003a: Health Data. Paris: OECD.
——, 2003b: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD.
——, 2007a: Economic Outlook. Paris: OECD.
——, 2007b: Education Statistics. Paris: OECD.
——, 2007c: Health Data. Paris: OECD.
Pampel, Fred C., 1994: Population Aging, Class Context, and Age Inequality in Public Spending. In: 
American Journal of Sociology 100(1), 153–195.
Busemeyer, Goerres, Weschle: Demands for Redistributive Policies in an Era of Demographic Aging 29
Pampel, Fred C./John B. Williamson, 1988: Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
1950–1980. In: American Journal of Sociology 93(6), 1424–1456.
Papadakis, Elim/Clive Bean, 1993: Popular Support for the Welfare State: A Comparison between 
Institutional Regimes. In: Journal of Public Policy 13, 227–254.
Pierson, Paul, 2001a: Introduction. Investigating the Welfare State at Century’s End. In: Paul Pierson 
(ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–14.
Pierson, Paul (ed.), 2001b: The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Poterba, James M., 1997: Demographic Structure and the Political Economy of Public Education. In: 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16(1), 48–66.
Scruggs, Lyle, 2006: The Generosity of Social Insurance, 1971–2002. In: Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 22 (3), 349–364.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 2007: Politik einer alternden Gesellschaft: Vom Generationenvertrag zum Gene-
rationenkonflikt? In: Peter Gruss (ed.), Die Zukunft des Alterns: Die Antwort der Wissenschaft. 
München: Beck, 279–304.
Svallfors, Stefan, 2003: Welfare Regimes and Welfare Opinions: A Comparison of Eight Western 
Countries. In: Social Indicators Research 64(3), 495–520.
——, 2004: Class, Attitudes and the Welfare State: Sweden in Comparative Perspective. In: Social 
Policy and Administration 38(2), 119–138.
Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 08/2
U. Dolata
The Transformative Capacity 
of New Technologies. 
How Innovations Affect 
Sectoral Change: Conceptual 
Considerations
DP 08/1
M.S. Allam, A. Goerres
Adopting the Euro in Post-
Communist Countries:  
An Analysis of the Attitudes 
toward the Single Currency
DP 07/15
J. Beckert
The Social Order of Markets
DP 07/14
G. Piotti
Why Do Companies Relocate? 
The German Discourse on 
Relocation
DP 07/13
R. Mayntz
The Architecture of Multi-
level Governance of Economic 
Sectors
DP 07/12
M. Höpner
Coordination and Organization:
The Two Dimensions of 
Nonliberal Capitalism
DP 07/11
G. Möllering, F. Stache
German–Ukrainian Business 
Relationships: Trust 
Development in the Face of 
Institutional Uncertainty
and Cultural Differences
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 08/1
G. Möllering
Inviting or Avoiding Deception 
through Trust? Conceptual 
Exploration of an Ambivalent 
Relationship
WP 07/5
A. Goerres
Can We Reform the Welfare 
State in Times of „Grey“ 
Majorities? The Myth of an 
Electoral Opposition between 
Younger and Older Voters in 
Germany
WP 07/4
J. Beckert
Wie viel Erbschaftssteuern?
WP 07/3
Fritz W. Scharpf
Reflections on Multilevel 
Legitimacy
WP 07/2
M. R. Busemeyer
Social Democrats and 
Education Spending: A Refined 
Perspective on Supply-Side 
Strategies
WP 07/1
M. Kahancová
Corporate Values in Local 
Contexts: Work Systems and 
Workers’ Welfare in Western 
and Eastern Europe
MPIfG Books
J. Beckert
Inherited Wealth
Princeton University Press, 2008
B. Harrington
Pop Finance: Investment Clubs 
and the New Investor Populism
Princeton University Press, 2008 
J. Beckert, R. Diaz-Bone,  
H. Ganßmann (Hg.) 
Märkte als soziale Strukturen
Campus, 2007
U. Dolata, R. Werle (Hg.),
Gesellschaft und die Macht der 
Technik: Sozioökonomischer 
und institutioneller Wandel 
durch Technisierung
Campus, 2007
J. Beckert, B. Ebbinghaus,  
A. Hassel, P. Manow (Hg.)
Transformationen des 
Kapitalismus. Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Streeck zum 
sechzigsten Geburtstag
Campus, 2006
S. Hiß
Warum übernehmen 
Unternehmen gesellschaftliche 
Verantwortung? 
Campus, 2006
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
